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Abstract:  
We develop a contingent claims model of a firm in financial distress with a formal 
account for renegotiations under the Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure. Shareholders 
and two classes of creditors (senior and junior) alternatively propose a reorganization 
plan subject to a vote. The bankruptcy judge can intervene in any renegotiation round to 
impose a plan. The multiple-stage bargaining process is solved in a non-cooperative 
game theory setting. The calibrated model yields liquidation rate, Chapter 11 duration 
and percentage of deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule that are consistent with 
empirical evidence. 
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1 Introduction
A corporation in nancial distress can either negotiate privately with its claimants or
le under the protection of the legal bankruptcy procedure. The recent bailouts of some
major U.S. companies during the latest crisis has emphasized the complex and critical
impact that the bankruptcy procedure can have on the economy as a whole. In the U.S.,
Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy Code presents an alternative to the liquidation of a bankrupt
rm by dening a judicial context in which the rm can reorganize its activities in order to
emerge as a viable entity. Over the last few years, Chapter 11 has become the dominant
mode of resolution of nancial distress for large public companies. Among the 213 bond
defaults recorded by Moodys from 1997 to 2005, Davydenko (2010) documents that 54% of
them are technical defaults (i.e. missed payment), while 37% are resolved through Chapter
11, with only 9% of defaults being resolved out of Court. These gures highlight the need
for a better understanding of the bankruptcy mechanism.
The aim of this paper is to formally model the characteristics of Chapter 11 negotia-
tion and to analyze the determinants of reorganization outcomes. Specically, we model
the strategic interaction between claimants in Chapter 11 as a multiple-stage bargaining
process, and solve it in a non-cooperative game theory setting. Our paper adds to the earlier
literature by modeling a complex and realistic negotiation process, that incorporates di¤er-
ent features of Chapter 11. In particular, we consider two classes of creditors with di¤erent
seniorities and allow claimants to sequentially propose reorganization plans. Shareholders
benet from the exclusivity period that allows them to propose the rst plan. One of these
plans can be conrmed by the bankruptcy judge if all claimants agree on its implementa-
tion. We also account for Chapter 11 cramdown provision which allows the judge to impose
a reorganization plan, thereby putting an end to a lengthy and costly negotiation. Further-
more, the bankruptcy judge has the opportunity to impose her own reorganization plan.
Finally, our model respects the rule of automatic stay of assets as creditors are not allowed
to liquidate parts of the assets as negotiations move from one round to another.
Our game-theoretic approach determines for each renegotiation round the possible equi-
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libria (liquidation, reorganization, or continuation to the next round) for every possible
asset value. By specifying a standard di¤usion process for asset value, we associate a prob-
ability to each of these equilibria, which yields a probabilistic representation of the Chapter
11 procedure with formal bargaining.
In line with empirical evidence, our model can generate several rounds of bargaining.
Ongoing negotiations are driven by claimholdersuncertainty about judge behavior. De-
pending on rm asset value, the class of claimants, which proposes a reorganization plan,
can have an incentive to narrow the chances of unanimous acceptance and hope for the
judge to impose terms that are more favorable to them.
Once the model is calibrated on characteristics of rms entering Chapter 11 as well as
on the bankruptcy timeline and costs, it replicates stylized facts about liquidation rates,
time spent under Chapter 11, and frequency of deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule
(APR).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the related
literature in section 2, we formally introduce the negotiation process under Chapter 11 in
section 3. In section 4, we solve the game by backward induction and characterize the
possible equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 presents the data and calibration method used to
implement the model numerically. Model results are analyzed and compared to empirical
evidence in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Early contingent claims models of corporate debt assimilate default with immediate liq-
uidation (Merton, 1974, Leland, 1994). The modelling of nancial distress has primarily
focused on out-of-Court renegotiations. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997) analyze strategic debt service, i.e. coupon reductions that sharehold-
ers can impose to creditors every time the rm is close to default. Mella-Barral (1999) study
private debt renegotiations when shareholders and creditors can alternatively make take-
it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) view renegotiations as a cooperative Nash
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bargaining game in which claimholders maximize renegotiations surplus to avoid costly liq-
uidation. However, the assumption of a cooperative game for renegotiations may be harder
to sustain for Chapter 11. Indeed, Brown (1989) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) argue
that rms in default will cease private renegotiations and le bankruptcy when hold out
problems are severe. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) as well as Datta and Iskandar-Datta
(1995) provide empirical support for this view.
Bruche and Naqvi (2010) explicitly account for an agency conict during nancial dis-
tress between shareholders and creditors, as the former decide on the time to default while
the latter decide on the time to liquidate. As acknowledged by these authors, this frame-
work is best suited for creditor-friendly bankruptcy procedures. In Chapter 11, the judge
is inuential in preserving the going-concern value of the rm.
Hege and Mella-Barral (2005) and Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) enrich the
renegotiation framework by allowing for multiple creditors. Both works examine exchange
o¤ers proposed by shareholders. In Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007), one class of
debt is bank debt and assumed to be renegotiable. The other is market debt, cannot be
renegotiated, but allows the rm to increase its debt capacity.
More recent are the contributions which aim at capturing Chapter 11 specicity into the
modelling of nancial distress. Moraux (2002), François and Morellec (2004), Galai, Raviv
and Wiener (2007), and Broadie, Chernov and Sundaresan (2007) assume that liquidation
after Chapter 11 is triggered by the excursion of asset value beneath a default threshold. In
these works however, the role of the judge is not taken into account. But, as documented
by Chang and Schoar (2008), the inuence of the judge on Chapter 11 outcomes is far from
neutral.
From a di¤erent methodological standpoint, various classication models have been
applied to the bankruptcy procedure. For instance, Luther (1998) uses articial neural
networks to predict Chapter 11 outcome. These works relate the likelihood of liquidation
vs. reorganization to the nancials of defaulting rms, but again, they fail to acknowledge
procedural aspects (including the role of the judge) as a key determinant of corporate
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restructuring.
3 The negotiation process model under Chapter 11
Our modelling needs to be consistent with the main features of the Chapter 11 procedure.
In the vast majority of cases, the rm in default les under Chapter 11 on a voluntary basis
(see e.g. White, 1996, for evidence). As a result, the management team stays in place after
ling, and enjoys an exclusivity period during which it can propose the rst reorganization
plan.1 Acceptance of the plan is subject to a vote among classes of claimholders. The
judge observes the process and can either validate the plan if unanimously accepted, call
for another round of renegotiations if unanimous consent is not achieved, or pronounce
rm liquidation if reaching an agreement becomes unlikely. The judge may also use the
cramdown provision, which allows her to impose a reorganization plan when she believes
the procedure is getting too lengthy and costly.2 In practice, successfully reorganized rms
may need more than one reorganization plan (see e.g. Carapeto, 2005).
Shareholders and creditors bargain over a sharing rule for asset value. The rule of
automatic stay prevents creditors to seize assets during renegotiations. Hence the dynamics
of asset value is not subject to partial liquidations (also known as "asset stripping").3 We
assume that all claimants have the same information about asset value, characteristics
of bankruptcy procedure and judge behaviour. In spite of bargaining being costly, we
show that our perfect and complete information setting can generate more than one round
of renegotiations. This is because claimholders are unsure about the judge behaviour,
and assign probabilities about her intervention in the negotiation process. In contrast
to Giammarino (1989) who argues that informational asymmetries increase the number
1This rst plan is in the best interests of shareholders as we abstract from agency conicts between
claimants.
2Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1998) show that judge interference in the procedure is a direct restriction
on the bargaining game that prevents claimholders from acting too strategically.
3One exceptional case of asset stripping is the failure of Eastern Airlines documented by Weiss and Wruck
(1998).
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of bargaining rounds and may require the intervention of the Court, we show that even
homogenous information among claimholders can generate multiple round bargaining as
soon as the judge behavior is perceived as uncertain.
3.1 The rm
We consider a rm nanced by two classes of debt with di¤erent priorities, paying a constant
and continuous coupon c to the creditors, and a constant dividend to the equityholders, until
default. We denote by Vt the the value of the rms assets at time t and assume that Vt,
which plays the role of a state variable, is instantly observable by all players. The default
event, at t = 0, starts the negotiation process under Chapter 11. We assume that coupon
and dividend payments are suspended during Chapter 11 negotiation, and resume if and
once the rm emerges from the process as a reorganized entity, at date t: The rms assets
value then follows a regime-switching log-normal process under the risk neutral measure:
dVt =
8<: rVtdt+ VtdZt if 0  t < t(r   )Vtdt+ VtdZt if t  t < T (1)
where r denotes the risk-free rate,  the dividend payout rate,  the volatility of the assets,
Zt is aQ Brownian motion and T is a stopping time representing the eventually reorganized
rm default event date.
3.2 The players
The negotiation process under Chapter 11 involves all the claimants of the rm, as well as
the bankruptcy judge. The creditors and equityholders are strategic participants, having a
stake in the rm, while the bankruptcy judge is a non-strategic player.
We assume the interests of the equityholders are represented by the same board of
directors as prior to ling and identify it with a single player, denoted Player e. The
creditors are divided into two classes of substantially similar claims, labeled senior and
junior (subordinated). As provided in the Code, the bankruptcy judge appoints a committee
to represent the interests of creditors in each class during the reorganization. We identify
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single players, denoted respectively by s and j, with the negotiators representing the interest
of senior and junior creditors. During the negotiation process, strategic players e; s and j
take their decisions independently, by taking into account their best individual interest.
Empirical evidence suggests that the bankruptcy judge, while having no personal stake in
the negotiation, does inuence the negotiation by controlling key parameters of the process.
Here, we let the judge decide on the maximum number of negotiation rounds, denoted K,
and allow her to intervene and stop the process at any round if an agreement is not reached
among the strategic players. The probability of the judges intervention at round k; denoted
by qk, reects the impatience of the judge, and can, for instance, increase with the number
of bargaining rounds and/or the length of the negotiation process.
Conditional on intervening, we further assume that the judge can either cramdown a
reorganization plan, or convert Chapter 11 negotiation into Chapter 7 liquidation.4 In the
event of a cramdown, the judge can decide to impose the last proposed plan, or any other
reorganization plan she nds "fair and equitable". What the judge will decide is not known
with certainty, and we denote by z the probability that the judge imposes her own plan.
A parameter, denoted , describes the judges attitude towards the claimants, that is, the
relative weight allocated to them in her own reorganization plan. The judges behavior is
thus characterized by the parameters K, qk, z, and , which we assume known by all the
claimants at the beginning of the negotiation process.
3.3 Bankruptcy costs
Bankruptcy costs are divided into two categories: nancial distress costs are borne during
the negotiation process, while liquidation costs reduce the value recovered from the assets
in the case of a liquidation. Bankruptcy costs play an important role, making a prompt
negotiated outcome interesting for all parties.
4To liquidate the rm, the bankruptcy judge can invoke one of the causes described in section 1112(b)(4)
of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, showing that there is substantial or continuing loss to the estate
and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. Other causes can include some negotiation
technicalities.
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We model nancial distress costs that are proportional both to the value of the assets
at the beginning of Chapter 11 negotiation, and to the length of the negotiation process,
capturing elements of direct (legal fees) as well as indirect (productivity loss) costs. For
simplicity, we assume that all bargaining rounds are of equal length d. Accordingly, an
amount V0d is due (in priority) at the end of each bargaining round, thus reducing the
total value of the shares of the claimants in the reorganized rm. In order to keep track
of the cumulated value of the nancial distress costs, capitalized at rate r, at the end of
negotiation round k, dene
Ck =
Xk 1
j=0

1 + erdj

V0d
=
1  erdk
1  erd V0d. (2)
On the other hand, liquidation costs are assumed to be proportional to the rms remain-
ing asset value, net of nancial distress costs. The proportion of the ex-nancial distress
costs asset value recovered in the case of a liquidation is denoted by 1  .
3.4 Chapter 11 outcomes
According to the provisions of the Code, each negotiation round consists in the proposal of
a reorganization plan by one of the player to the other claimants, who then vote to accept
or reject it. Thus, at each negotiation round, a plan is submitted by one of the players,
labeled Leader, to the two other players, labeled Follower 1 and Follower 2. We consider
three possible outcomes, depending on the followersreaction to the leaders proposition.
In the rst case, the rm is reorganized and emerges as a new entity. This new rm is
shared between the claimants either according to the plan proposed by the leader at that
round (if the followers agreed to it, or if the judge imposed it), or according to a plan
decided by the judge. In the second case, the rm is liquidated. This happens if the judge
decides to stop the negotiation process when the plan proposed by the leader is unanimously
rejected by the two followers. Finally, in the third case, nothing is resolved and the process
moves to the next negotiation round, where another player is selected to propose a new
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reorganization plan. This happens if the judge does not interfere in the bargaining process
when the followers do not accept the leaders proposition. However, since nancial distress
costs are borne continuously during the negotiation process, whenever the rms assets value
is no longer su¢ cient to cover the cumulated nancial distress costs, then the reorganization
process stops and the rm is immediately liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Code, leaving
nothing to the claimants.
4 Solving the negotiation game
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium strategies of the three strategic players, and
obtain, for each player, the expected value of the outcome of the negotiation game, at the
moment the default event is triggered.
4.1 Time sequence of events
Our model spans the life of the rm, over an innite horizon, starting from t = 0 when
a default event triggers the Chapter 11 negotiation process. If the process results in a
reorganization, at date t, the reorganized rm continues operating until a second default
event occurs at date T .
We assume that the nancial distress costs are covered by the rms asset during the
negotiation process. The rm stops operating, with a null recovery value, if at any time
during the negotiation the value of the assets vanishes.
At t = 0, coupon and dividend payments are suspended. The equityholder then has d
units of time to prepare a rst reorganization plan to be submitted to the creditors.
At t = d, provided Vd > C1; the rst plan is proposed. If both creditors approve the
plan, or if the judge intervenes with a cram-down, a new reorganized rm emerges; this
rm distributes dividends and new reorganized coupons, and continues its operations until
T . If the judge intervenes and imposes liquidation, the rm is liquidated according to
the Absolute Priority Rule and the process terminates. Otherwise, the negotiation process
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continues: the junior creditor has d units of time to prepare a second reorganization plan to
be submitted to the two other claimants, namely the equityholder and the senior creditor.
At t = 2d, provided V2d > C2; the second plan is proposed. Again, the rm may emerge
if both players approve the plan, or if the judge cramdowns a plan, or may be liquidated if
the judge so decides. Otherwise, the senior creditor has d units of time to prepare a third
reorganization plan to be submitted to the two other claimants.
At t = 3d, provided V3d > C3; the third plan is proposed, with the three same possible
outcomes. If the process continues, the claimants alternate in proposing reorganization
plans following the same sequence, until either the rm is reorganized or liquidated.
For simplicity and tractability reasons, we assume that any further nancial distress
after the rm emerges from Chapter 11 leads to the liquidation of the rm.
4.2 Outcome values
In our setting, the players strategies and the resulting Chapter 11 outcomes depend on the
observed level of the assets value, which denes the state of the system, and on the initial
debt contract, represented here by the contractual coupons, which are given parameters.
We denote the contractual coupons by c0 = c0s + c
0
j ; where c
0
s is the senior debt coupon and
c0j is the subordinated debt coupon. In the following subsections, we compute the value of
what each claimant receives according to the outcome of the negotiation process, at discrete
times t = kd corresponding to the end of the kth negotiation round. To keep track of the
value of assets net of nancial distress costs at date t = kd when v = Vkd, we dene the
auxiliary variable wk  v   Ck.
4.2.1 Liquidation
If the rm is liquidated after k negotiation rounds at time t = kd, the assets of the rm,
net of the nancial distress costs, are disposed of at a proportional liquidation costs . The
liquidation value of the rm thus depends on the asset value v = Vkd and on the cumulated
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nancial distress costs at the end of round k, and is given by:
!LF (v; k) = max [(1  )wk; 0] . (3)
If wk  0, then nothing is left to be shared among the claimants and !LF (v; k) = 0. How-
ever, if wk > 0, then the senior, junior and equityholders liquidation payo¤s, according
to Absolute Priority Rule, depend on the contractual coupons c0s and c
0
j , and are given
respectively by
!Ls (v; k) = min

!LF (v; k);
c0s
r

; (4)
!Lj (v; k) = min
"
max

!LF (v; k) 
c0s
r
; 0

;
c0j
r
#
; (5)
and
!Le (v; k) = max

!LF (v; k) 
c0
r
; 0

: (6)
We denote by !L(v; k) =

!Ls (); !Lj (); !Le ()

the vector of liquidation values at assets
value v and negotiation round k:
4.2.2 Emergence values
If the rm emerges from nancial distress after k negotiation rounds at time t = kd and asset
value v = Vt   Ck > 0, then the reorganized rm continues its operations by distributing
new coupons cs and cj to the senior and junior creditors respectively, until further default
at time T . Recall that we assume that further default leads to immediate liquidation. The
value at (v; k) of the reorganized rm depends on the reorganized coupon and on the value
of the assets, net of nancial distress costs, at the emergence from Chapter 11, and is given
by:
Evt
Z T
t
(c+ Vu) e
 r(u t)du

+ (1  )Evt
h
e r(T t)B
i
(7)
where Evt () denotes the expectation EQ (jt; Vt = v) under the risk-neutral measure Q, 
represents the tax rate, c  cs+ cj is the total reorganized coupon,  the payout rate, r the
risk-free interest rate,  the proportional liquidation costs and B the nal default barrier.
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Equivalently, the value of the rm after emergence, which is the object of bargaining between
claimants, is given by:
!RF (v; c; k) = wk +
c
r
 
1 

B
wk
 
1 
!
  B

B
wk
 
1 
(8)
where  = +++ ,  =

r  2
2

 and  =
p
2r + 2. The rst term in (8) is the value of
the assets at the emergence time, the second term is the present value of tax benets of the
operating rm, and the third term is the present value of liquidation costs.
Denote the liquidation values for each claimant at the nal default barrier B when the
reorganized coupon pair is c  (cs; cj) by !Di (B; c); i 2 fs; j; eg. Upon reorganization at
(v; k) with a new coupon c = cs + cj , the value for the three claimants (senior creditor,
junior creditor and equityholder) is therefore given respectively, for v > Ck; by
!Ri (v; c; k) =
ci
r
 
1 

B
wk
 
1 
!
+ !Di (B; c)

B
wk
 
1 
; i 2 fs; jg (9)
and
!Re (v; c; k)
= !RF (v; c; k) 
 
!Rs (v; c; k) + !
R
j (v; c; k)

= wk   (1  ) c
r
 
1 

B
wk
 
1 
!
 B

B
wk
 
1 
+ !De (B; c): (10)
Following Leland (1994), we assume that default is decided by equityholders, and that
the liquidation barrier B is determined so as to maximize equity value, given the limited
liability of equityholders. The optimal liquidation barrier for equityholders is then
B =
(1  )
r
c. (11)
Notice that the reorganized coupon c has a direct impact on the liquidation barrier. Using
the expression of the default barrier in (11) and rearranging (8), the total value of the rm
at v; k when the reorganized coupon is c for v > Ck is given by:
!RF (v; c; k)
=
wk

 
+ 
c
rwk
 


1   + 

(1  )c
rwk
 1
1 
!
(12)
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As developed by Leland (1994), the liquidation leaves the creditors with value (1  )B
and the equityholders with nothing. Rearranging (9), the total value of debt for v > Ck is
given by
!Rs (v; c; k) + !
R
j (v; c; k)
=
wk

 
c
rwk
 

1
1      (1  )

(1  )c
rwk
 1
1 
!
; (13)
while the value of equity for v > Ck is
!Re (v; c; k)
=
wk

 
  (1  )c
rwk
+ (1  )

(1  )c
rwk
 1
1 
!
: (14)
Notice that, at a given time kd and asset value v, both the value of the reorganized rm
and of the reorganized debt are concave in c, while the value of equity is decreasing in c.
We denote by !R(v; c; k) =

!Rs (); !Rj (); !Re ()

the vector of reorganization values at
asset value v, negotiation round k and when the reorganized coupon pair is c.
4.2.3 The role of the judge
A reorganized rm may emerge from nancial distress after k negotiation rounds at time
t = kd and asset value v = Vt under the bankruptcy judges plan. We suppose that the
judges plan is, as stipulated in the Code, fair and equitable; in that respect, we assume that
the judges plan gives to each player at least his liquidation payo¤, thus ruling out Absolute
Priority Rule violation, and shares the residual value among the claimants according to
some sharing vector, denoted by  =
 
s; j ; e

; satisfying:
0  i  1; i 2 fs; j; eg
and X
i2fs;j;eg
i = 1:
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Therefore, a reorganized coupon pair proposed by the bankruptcy judge, denoted c, is
such that the each claimants payo¤ satises
!Ri (v; c
 ; k) = i

!RF (v; c
; k)  !LF (v; k)

| {z }
Residual value
+ !Li (v; k), i 2 fs; j; eg (15)
where !RF (v; c
; k) is the total rm value dened in (12) and the liquidation payo¤s !Li (v; k)
are dened in (4)   (6) for i 2 fs; j; eg. For a given (v; k), the reorganized coupon pair
satisfying (15) is denoted by c to simplify notation - but is a function of (v; k) (see Appendix
A). The sharing vector  denes the proportion of the "benets of reorganization" that
each player gets from the judges plan. This can be assimilated to the solution of a Nash
bargaining game, where  would then represent the vector of the claimants bargaining
powers, the residual value corresponding to the benet of cooperation between the claimants,
and where the liquidation payo¤s represent the non-cooperation threat.
4.2.4 Continuation values
If the rm is neither reorganized, nor liquidated after k negotiation rounds, then we dene
continuation values at time t = kd and state variable value v = Vt, which are the expected
values of the players future payo¤s, taking into account the dynamics of the rms asset
value.
Denote ! (v; k) =

!s () ; !j () ; !e ()

the vector of equilibrium outcomes of nego-
tiation round k when the rmsassets value Vkd = v, k 2 [1;K], that is, for a claimant
i 2 fs; j; eg:
!i (v; k) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  Ck
!Li (v; k) if the rm is liquidated
!Ri (v; c; k) if the rm is reorganized with c
!Ci (v; k) otherwise
9>>>=>>>; if v > Ck
(16)
where the continuation payo¤ !Ci (v; k) for each player is dened as the expected value of
the outcome at the next bargaining round, and continuation is not allowed when the game
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reaches the end of the negotiation process, such that, for i 2 fs; j; eg ;
!Ci (v; k) =
8<: e rdEvt

!
 
V(k+1)d,k + 1

for k = 0; : : : ;K   1
0 for k = K:
(17)
We denote by !C (v; k) =

!Cs () ; !Cj (v; k) ; !Ce (v; k)

the vector of continuation outcomes
at (v; k) and !CF (v; k) = !
C
s (v; k) + !
C
j (v; k) + !
C
e (v; k) the continuation value of the rm
at (v; k), k 2 [0;K] :
4.3 Negotiation round game
Table 1 depicts the normal form representation of the game at a given round k, between
the claimant who proposes a reorganization plan, labelled 0 for "Leader", and the other
two claimants, labelled 1 and 2 for "Follower 1" and "Follower 2", who vote on it. Notice
that we use numerical labels when the claimants are referred by their role as players in the
negotiation process, i = f0; 1; 2g, and literary labels when they are identied by their role
as stakeholders, i = fs; j; eg.
The outcome of a given negotiation round depends on the pair of binary decisions made
by Followers 1 and 2, on the plan proposed by the leader, on the continuation values, and on
the judges behavior. We use a Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium solution concept to solve this
three-player game, where the outcomes are vectors in R3. Thus, when the leader proposes
his reorganization plan, he takes into account the equilibrium reactions of the two followers,
where neither player has a unilateral incentive to change his strategy.
Notice that a reorganization plan is completely dened by a proposal c = (cs; cj) for the
reorganized coupon, which is su¢ cient to compute the share of each player in the reorganized
rm, according to (9) and (14).
Consider each possible pair of binary decisions by the followers, denoted D = (D1; D2) ;
where Di 2 fA;Rg is the decision of Follower i, A stands for Accepting the leaders plan
and R stands for Rejecting the leaders plan". For each decision pair, the best proposal
of the leader, taking into account the reactions of the followers to his proposal, is a plan
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c = (cs; cj) solving at a given t = kd, v = Vt, an optimization problem of the form:
max
c
OD0 (v; k) (18)
s.t. ODi (v; k) Q bi, i 2 f1; 2g ; (19)
where ODi represents the expected value of the outcome of the negotiation round for player
i if the followers choose decision pair D; and bi represents what Follower i can achieve by
unilaterally deviating from his decision. The four possible combinations of decisions taken
by the followers thus dene four di¤erent optimization problems, and their solutions specify
the best plan that the Leader can propose for each of these four possible situations. Notice
that the precise formulation of these four optimization problems depends on the identity,
as stakeholders, of the leader and followers.
For a given (v; k) ; v > Ck, dene the auxiliary variable
y =
B
wk
=
 (1  )
rwk
c; (20)
the "distance to default" at wk. Notice that y is proportional to c at (v; k) ; so that it
uniquely denes the total coupon in any reorganization plan at (v; k). Feasible values of y
are in the interval [0; 1] : In all cases, that is, for all possible decision pairs and identity of the
leader and followers, optimization problem (18)-(19) can be transformed by a simple change
of variable into an equivalent problem of maximizing a concave function of y over a closed
interval, and solutions for all possible cases can be obtained analytically (see Appendix
A). The solution of optimization problem (18)-(19) at (v; k) when the decision pair of the
followers isD yields the best plan, denoted cD(v; k); and the corresponding optimal expected
value of the leaders outcome, denoted !D0 (v; k):
The equilibrium strategy vector for a given negotiation round when the asset value is v,
denoted  (v; k) = (i ()) ; i 2 f0; 1; 2g, is obtained by comparing the leaders best outcome
corresponding to each of the four possible decision pairs. The leaders equilibrium strategy
is the one that maximizes his share, so that the equilibrium outcome vector and strategies
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at t = kd, v = Vt are given by:
D(v; k) = argmax
D
f!D0 (v; k)g
0 (v; k) = c
D(v;k)(v; k)
i (v; k) = D

i (v; k), i 2 f1; 2g
!i (v; k) = !
D(v;k)
i (v; k), i 2 f0; 1; 2g: (21)
4.4 Equilibrium solution
At t = kd, k = 0; : : : ;K, and asset value v = Vt, denote !i (v; k) the expected value,
for claimant i, of what he will ultimately recover from the Chapter 11 process, and !F (v; k)
the total value of the rm. These value functions are dened recursively by the following
dynamic program
!i (v; k) = !

i (v; k) ; k = 1; : : :K
!i (v; 0) = e
 rdEv0[!i (Vd; 1)]
!F (v; k) =
X
i2fs;j;eg
!i (v; k) ; k = 0; : : :K; (22)
where !i (v; k) is dened by (16)-(17), and where the equilibrium outcomes are determined
by solving the negotiation game at each round. At the entry in Chapter 11, the share of
the rm expected by each claimant and the value of the rm are given by !i (V0; 0) and
!F (V0; 0) :
Starting from the last negotiation round, the equilibrium outcome vector is obtained by
backward induction as a function of k and v = Vkd. Notice that the equilibrium outcome
vector at a given k cannot be obtained in closed-form as a function of v, and we use a
numerical algorithm to compute, at a given negotiation round, the outcomes of claimants
on a grid of discretized asset values. Each claimants outcome function at a given k is then
approximated by a piecewise linear interpolation function, which is then used in (17) to
obtain the continuation values. Details about the interpolation function and the backward
recursion algorithm are given in Appendix B.
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5 Numerical implementation
This section presents the model calibration. A sample of rms ling Chapter 11 is specif-
ically constructed to estimate rm-specic parameters like asset returns expectation and
volatility, coupon rate, and share of senior debt. Other parameters including costs and du-
ration of the bankruptcy procedure, are set according to recent empirical studies on Chapter
11.
5.1 The data
Our sample consists in U.S. public rms that led for Chapter 11 over the period 1997
to 2007. Filings records are obtained from BankruptcyData (www.bankruptcydata.com),
a division of New Generation Research, Inc. Our initial sample contains 1,811 lings that
led to either liquidation, reorganization or merger. We rst restricted the data to large
companies with total asset value of more than $ 1 billion. This rst lter led to 183 lings.
Second, we excluded nancial, insurance, real estate and public administration rms since
they have a di¤erent treatment under Chapter 11. The second lter led to 156 lings.
All the rm-level data are obtained from Compustat and are measured as of the last
two years before the default date. Because of our reliance on Compustat for rm-specic
data, we excluded 25 lings not covered by this database. Among the lings that were left,
three rms led for Chapter 11 twice during our sample period.5 Our nal sample consists
of 128 rms and 131 Chapter 11 cases.
Table 2 provides information on the ling dates as well as the industry distribution. Not
surprisingly and as shown by Panel A, the majority of rms in our sample led for Chapter
11 during the 20012002 recession.
5Montgomery Wald Holding led for Chapter 11 in 07/07/1997 and then in 12/28/2000. McLeod USA
INC defaulted in 1/30/2002, emerged and then defaulted again in 2005. U.S. Airways was reported as Pas-
senger Airline that entered into Chap 11 in 08/11/2002 and then as Holding company for Passengers Airlines
that defaulted in 09/12/2004. For each of these companies, we keep both default events as observations in
our sample.
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5.2 Model calibration
The average 10year Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) over the 1997-2007 period is
3.83%. Consequently, we set r = 4%. Apart from the risk-free rate, the parameters of our
model can be classied into two categories: rm-specic parameters and bankruptcy-specic
parameters. Table 3 summarizes the calibration results.
5.2.1 Firm-specic parameters
These parameters must characterize a typical rm initiating a Chapter 11 ling. We rst
compute the series of quarterly log-returns on assets for the 131 sample rms over the
two years prior to their entry in Chapter 11. Median values for the expected return and
volatility of assets returns are 1.41% and 34%, respectively. Accordingly, we set  = 1:5%
and  = 35%.
For each ling rm, the coupon rate (in percentage of asset value) is obtained by multi-
plying book leverage with the risk-free rate. Book leverage is calculated from the quarterly
balance sheet on the eight quarters preceding Chapter 11 ling, that is, for rm n
Book leveragen =
1
8

8X
i=1

Total debtn;i
Total debtn;i + Total equityn;i

,
where total equity is approximated by
Total equityn;i = Common equityn;i   Purchase of common
and preferred stocksn;i + Sale of common
and preferred stocksn;i,
and total debt is approximated by
Total debtn;i = Long term debtn;i +Debt in current liabilitiesn;i.
Our coupon rate (c = 10 with V = 100) is the rounded value of the median coupon rate
(0.1077).
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The share of senior debt is computed from the annual balance sheet over the two years
preceding Chapter 11 ling as6
n = 1 
1
2

2X
i=1

Debt subordinatedn;i
Long term debtn;i

.
The median of all n is 81.13%, so we set  = 80%.
For rms emerging from Chapter 11, we set the net tax advantage of debt equal to 30%,
in line with the estimates of Graham and Mills (2008), and the payout rate equal to 2%, in
line with the estimates of Ericsson and Reneby (2005).
5.2.2 Bankruptcy-specic parameters
In our model, the bankruptcy procedure is completely characterized by the maximum num-
ber of negotiation rounds, the duration of each bargaining round, the probabilities of the
judges interference and cramdown, and the vector  reecting the judges own reorganiza-
tion plan. We also need to specify the costs associated to the procedure.
Carapeto (2005) shows that on a sample of 144 Chapter 11 rms that reorganized
successfully and had more than one plan over the period 19861997, the average number
of reorganization plans is 3.2. Moreover, she shows that about two-thirds of Chapter 11
rms require more than one plan before an agreement can be attained. Consequently,
we assume a total number of negotiation rounds K = 3, thus allowing each claimant to
present their reorganization plan. Furthermore, the recently amended paragraph 1121 of
the Bankruptcy Code states that the 180-day period for obtaining plan approval may not
be extended beyond 20 months. We therefore set bargaining rounds of constant length
d = 2 years. These parameters lead to a maximum procedure of 6 years, which is roughly
consistent with empirical studies on Chapter 11 durations. For instance, Bris, Welsch and
Zhu (2006), Denis and Rodgers (2007), and Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian (2007) document
durations of Chapter 11 ranging from less than one year to more than 8 years.
As far as the judge behavior is concerned, we assume that her impatience is constant
6The quarterly amount of subordinated debt is not reported by Compustat.
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during the reorganization process,7 and we assume there is 75% chance (i.e. qk = 34 for
1  k  K) that she intervenes.8 We further assume the judge is equally likely to impose
the last proposed plan or her own. Accordingly, we set z = 0:5. Finally, to reinforce
the fairness and equity characteristics of the judges plan, it is reasonable to assume that
the residual value is equally distributed among the claimants, leading to a sharing vector
 =
 
1
3 ;
1
3 ;
1
3

.
In our model, bankruptcy costs are broken down into two components: liquidation and
nancial distress costs. Liquidation costs are proportional to the current asset value by a
factor : Financial distress costs are assumed proportional to the length of the process and
are characterized by a factor .
The empirical literature o¤ers di¤erent estimation methods and a wide range of values
for bankruptcy costs. We use the estimates provided by Bris et al. (2006) as inputs to our
model. Our choice is motivated by the following reasons. First, these estimates are based on
the largest Chapter 11 sample in the literature.9 Second, their sample provides estimates of
both the liquidation and nancial distress costs. Third, their sample period, which ranges
from 1995 to 2001, is close to ours. In addition, they estimate direct nancial distress costs
as a proportion of the assets value at the entry at Chapter 11. Therefore, we use liquidation
costs of 2%. Bris et al. (2006) nd average direct nancial distress costs equal to 9.5%. Not
7The assumption of constant interference probability results from two opposite considerations. On one
hand, Baird and Morrison (2001) point out that the judge holds the option to determine the renegotiation
outcome and, as predicted by real options theory, is better o¤ waiting for the arrival of new information
(i.e. the judge becomes more patient with time). On the other hand, welfare concerns induce the judge to
accelerate the costly procedure (i.e. the judge becomes less patient with time).
8Although we could not nd direct evidence on judge intervention frequency, Evans (2003) documents
frequent judicial discretionary actions in Chapter 11. For instance, among the 290 cases in her sample, the
judge decided to alter the exclusivity period (i.e. the length of the rst round) in 120 cases. She also nds
signicant di¤erences in discretionary actions as well as bankruptcy outcomes across judges  reinforcing
the idea that judge behaviour is not entirely predictable by claimholders.
9Altman (1984) uses a sample of 19 cases, Weiss (1990) uses 37 cases, Betker (1997) 75 cases, Lubben
(2000) 22 cases, and LoPucki and Doherty (2004) 48 cases, while Bris et al. (2006) use a sample of 300 large
lings.
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much is reported about indirect nancial distress costs, but if we assume comparable order
of magnitude, the total (direct and indirect) nancial distress costs amount to 20% of the
assets value at the entry in Chapter 11 per year.
6 Analysis of results
We start by reporting the main output of the model, namely the di¤erent plans proposed
at each round as a function of asset value. This allows us to identify the possible equilibria
and their corresponding range for asset value. Next, we infer the probabilities associated to
each outcome, the average time spent in Chapter 11 as well as the frequency of violations
from the Absolute Priority Rule (APR) three quantities that we can relate to empirical
data.
6.1 Proposed plans
Figure 1 depicts the plans proposed by the di¤erent classes of claimholders during the three
rounds. These plans are summarized by the triplet of rm value fractions that are o¤ered
to each class of claimants.
For each round, there is a critical threshold for asset value below which the rm is
liquidated. This threshold corresponds to the accumulated coupon payments and costs of
nancial distress, and therefore increases with the next round. Above this threshold, a
reorganization plan is actually proposed.
Figure 1a shows the plans proposed by shareholders during the rst round. For a
su¢ ciently high level of asset value (around 62 in our base case), shareholders have no
interest in making concessions with creditors, as they expect the rm to be wealthy enough
to obtain better terms in the future. That is why they voluntarily o¤er a plan leaving
nothing to senior creditors and a minimal share to junior creditors (to obtain their vote
and avoid liquidation). Shareholders expect this plan to be either rejected which will lead
negotiations to the next round or to be crammed down by the judge, giving them either
the fair and equitableshare or an extremely favorable outcome to them.
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As asset value goes lower, the likelihood of liquidation increases and induces shareholders
to make concessions. As a matter of fact, they o¤er a plan that is accepted by both creditors
when asset value lies within 48 and 62.
But if asset value gets very close to the liquidation threshold (between 40 and 48 in our
base case), shareholdersvalue becomes so small that they have an incentive to o¤er the
plan that, again, shares nothing with senior creditors, and gives the smallest possible share
to junior creditors. This desperate plan is motivated by the fact that, in expectation,
shareholders are better o¤ gambling on the judge intervention as they have almost nothing
left to lose.
A similar logic applies to the second round. Figure 1b shows that, when asset value
is high enough, senior creditors will grant themselves almost all of rm value, leaving just
a small fraction to shareholders to get their vote. Shareholdersacceptance is cheaper to
buy since they are last in priority. Again, worst case for senior creditors is that the plan is
rejected and negotiations move on to the third round. At best, the judge may cram down
this plan that is extremely favorable to them.
For a wide set of intermediate values of asset (between 100 and 300 in our base case),
senior creditors are better o¤ reaching the unanimous consent, and the proposed shares
reect the relative priority of the three claimants.
As asset value gets very close to the liquidation threshold, senior creditors behave in
a similar fashion as shareholders in the rst round, as they o¤er again a desperateplan
granting a minimal fraction to shareholders.
The logic is simplied when it comes to the third round since it is the last round. Junior
creditors, who are now the leader, know they cannot expect negotiations to continue. But
since they are last in priority, they nd no benet in making concessions. Hence the only
plan they propose is the minimal fraction that warrants shareholders acceptance and the
rest of rm value to them (see Figure 1c). Clearly, this plan can only be adopted but with
judge cramdown.
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6.2 Equilibrium probabilities
We compute, for each round k, the probability that the geometric Brownian motion, initially
starting at v = V0 at the entry in Chapter 11, ends up in the domain of each equilibrium.
These probabilities then need to be adjusted for judge intervention: In case of partial
acceptance of the plan, there is a probability qk that the judge imposes a plan (her own
with probability z and the last proposed plan with probability 1   z). This allows us
to nally determine, for each round, the probabilities of liquidation, reorganization under
the leaders plan and reorganization under the judges plan (see Appendix C for details).
Results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
Our calibrated base case yields a liquidation probability (14.36%) that is in line with
observed liquidation rates in Chapter 11 procedure. Table 6 Panel A surveys the liquidation
rates reported by most recent empirical studies on Chapter 11 lings from public rms.
These rates lie between 14% and 24%, indicating a strong consensus between observed
liquidation likelihood and our base case parameterization. Interestingly, the conditional
liquidation probability of our model increases as one moves from one round to another,
indicating the decay in reorganization possibilities as time passes.
There is approximately one third of chances that the judge will cramdown the "fair
and equitable" plan, mostly after the rst round. Unfortunately, we cannot relate this
gure to any statistics about judge intervention. Our base case otherwise indicates that
the most likely outcome is reorganization under shareholdersplan (42.04% of probability).
The probability of getting to the third round is small but this is caused by our stylized
assumptions of three rounds of equal duration. As we will see in the next subsection, our
calibration yields an overall Chapter 11 duration that is consistent with observations.
Equilibrium probabilities display great sensitivity to asset volatility. Consistent with
intuition, very risky rms become more likely to be liquidated (probability increases to
24%), while safer rms have greater chances of being reorganized under the Leaders plan
mostly shareholders plan after the rst round. Other sensitivities with rms-specic
parameters are much smaller and in line with expectations (see Table 4). The rm will
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avoid liquidation and enjoy a reorganization plan as asset drift is higher and leverage is
higher. This is in line with Denis and Rodgers (2007) who nd a positive relation between
the reorganization likelihood and the change in operating margin on one hand (although not
signicant), and the liability ratio prior to ling Chapter 11 on the other hand. We further
note from Table 4 that liquidation probability slightly decreases as the junior creditor is
less important. This is mostly explained by the fact that senior creditors will nd it easier
to have their plan accepted after the second round.
As far as bankruptcy-specic parameters are concerned, we note that when the judge can
credibly signal her intention to impose her own plan (i.e. higher z), then claimholders have
a stronger incentive to reach an agreement by themselves. As shown in Table 5, probability
of liquidation as well as that of reorganization under the judge plan sharply decrease. The
benets of this incentive accrue to shareholders as they rst propose a plan (compared to
base case, the probability of reorganization under their plan goes from 52.42% to 70.50%
as z goes from 0.5 to 0.65). As expected, liquidation probability decreases with costs of
liquidation, but this e¤ect is economically small. By contrast, costs of nancial distress
turn out to be a more important driver of outcome probabilities. A very costly procedure
(say  = 30%) reduces the scope for renegotiation and makes early liquidation more likely.
The same e¤ect is obtained by increasing the length of a round. As d goes from 2 years
(base case) to 3 years, liquidation probability increases (mostly in the rst round) at the
expense of all reorganization probabilities.
6.3 Chapter 11 duration
By weighting the length of each round with the corresponding probability of reorganiza-
tion (either under Leader or judge plan), we can compute the model-implied duration of
reorganization under Chapter 11. With the base case, we obtain an average duration of
365

2 42:04 + 31:89
52:42 + 33:22
+ 4 10:26 + 1:2
52:42 + 33:22
+ 6 0:12 + 0:12
52:42 + 33:22

;
that is, 832 days. This gure matches empirically reported Chapter 11 duration rather well.
Table 6 Panel B reports the mean length of time spent in Chapter 11 according to empirical
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studies. This length of time lies within 708 and 915 days, with the exception of the study
by Kalay et al. (2007) who nd a signicantly shorter Chapter 11 duration (447 days on
average).
As expected, higher costs of nancial distress induce claimholders to spend less time
in renegotiations (average time to reorganization decreases to 794 days when  = 30%).
A similar remark holds when the judge is more prone to imposing her own plan (average
time to reorganization decreases to 796 days when z = 0:65). Other sensitivities are not
economically meaningful, so we do not report them.
6.4 APR violations
From our model simulations, it is straightforward to infer the probability that the Absolute
Priority will not be respected. Indeed, each claimholder votes in favor of the proposed plan
provided the fraction of rm value they get is at least equal to the one obtained from the
Absolute Priority Rule. As a consequence, deviations from the APR only occur when the
following three conditions are met: (i) the plan is rejected, (ii) the judge intervenes, and
(iii) she imposes the Leaders plan (and not the fair and equitable one).
The probability of deviation from the APR is therefore equal to the probability of
reorganization under judge plan (as reported in Tables 4 and 5) multiplied by 1  z. Thus,
our base case parameters yield a probability of APR violations of 16.61%. This gure is
consistent with recent empirical estimates as reported from Table 6, Panel C.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed and solved a non-cooperative game approach to model
renegotiations under the bankruptcy law. By doing so, we hope to contribute to the mod-
elling of nancial distress in the contingent claims literature, by opening "the black box"
of Chapter 11 bargaining process. We show that rational claimholders can assess the likeli-
hood of bankruptcy outcomes (liquidation or reorganization under di¤erent types of plans),
using information about the rm and the legal procedure. Our approach uses a simple
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information structure and only relies on the perceived randomness of the judges actions 
which is su¢ cient to generate multiple-round bargaining and multiple equilibria. A proper
calibration of the model yields liquidation rate, Chapter 11 duration and percentage of devi-
ations from the Absolute Priority Rule that are in line with statistics reported by empirical
studies. The model also generates predictions as to how these observables are a¤ected by
changes in rm-specic or bankruptcy-specic parameters.
Admittedly, the modelling of negotiations under Chapter 11 could incorporate additional
aspects that would possibly enrich the analysis, but also make the approach less tractable.
For instance, informational asymmetries (i.e. shareholders and management having a more
accurate knowledge of asset dynamics than creditors) could alter the equilibria of the game.
In addition, conicting interests between management and shareholders could modify the
type of proposed plan managers being primarily concerned with avoiding liquidation to
keep their job. Li and Li (1999) argue however, that informational asymmetries and agency
problems are less severe in legal bankruptcy than in private renegotiations, as claimholders
are forced to disclose information.
Another direction for future research is to model more explicitly the role of the judge.
Among the judges primary goals, the literature on bankruptcy design (see e.g. Aghion, Hart
and Moore, 1992) commonly cites: preserving the bonding role of debt (by enforcing the
Absolute Priority Rule) and ensuring the bankruptcy procedure acts as an e¢ cient "lter"
for distressed rms (i.e. liquidating insolvent rms while reorganizing protable ones). More
personal career concerns (such as inuence or prestige) could also be incorporated. This
type of research direction is not trivial, as the judge s objective function is, in essence,
multi-dimensional.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Reorganization plans
We rst show that the judges vector of weights ; along with sharing rule (15), denes
a unique reorganization plan c at (v; k). We then derive the analytic solution to the
optimization problem (18)-(19) for all combinations of decisions by the followers, and all
possible identities of the leader.
Using the auxiliary variable y dened in (20) in (8) and (10), the reorganization value
of the rm, the equityholders, and of the creditors can be written as follows for y 2 [0; 1] :
!RF (v; y; k) =
wk


+
y
1    


1   + 

y
1
1 

(23)
!Re (v; y; k) =
wk


  y + (1  ) y 11 

(24)
!Rd (v; y; k)  !Rs (v; y; k) + !Rj (v; y; k) (25)
=
wk


1
1   y  

1
1      (1  )

y
1
1 

:
Bankruptcy judges plan
For a given asset value v at negotiation round k, the reorganized coupon pair c(v; k)
satisfying (15) is obtained by solving
!Re (v; c
; k)  e

!RF (v; c
 ; k)  (1  )wk

= !Le (v; k). (26)
Replacing !RF and !
R
e by their expression in (23)-(24) and rearranging yields
y

1 + e

1  

  y 11 

1  + e

+

1  

= 

1  e  
!Le (v; k)
wk

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Di¤erentiating the l.h.s. with respect to y, we obtain that the rst derivative vanishes
when y

1  = (1 (1 e))(1 )(1 )(1 )+e(+(1 )) 2 (0; 1) : Moreover, the second derivative is
 y 2 11  (1  ) (1  ) + e ( +  (1  ))
(1  )2 (1  ) < 0:
We obtain that the l.h.s. is concave in y and admits a maximum in (0; 1). Moreover its
value is 0 at y = 0, while it is  (1  e) > 0 at y = 1. Therefore, there is a unique solution
to (26) corresponding to a value for y in [0; 1] since 0  !Le (v;k)wk  (1  ), yielding
0  

1  e  
!Le (v; k)
wk

  (1  e) :
Leaders optimal plan
D = (A;A) If both followers accept the plan, then the outcome vector is !R(v; c; k). In
that case, the leaders best proposal is the solution of
max
c
!R0 (v; c; k) (27)
s.t.
!Ri (v; c; k)  qk

z!Ri

v; c ; k

+ (1  z)!Ri (v; c; k)

+ (1  qk)!Ci (v; k); (28)
or, equivalently,
!Ri (v; c; k)  bi; (29)
bi =
8<:
qkz!
R
i (v;c ;k)+(1 qk)!Ci (v;k)
1 qk(1 z) if qk(1  z) < 1
 1 otherwise.
; i 2 f1; 2g : (30)
where condition (28) is obtained by comparing the reorganization payo¤ with the
expected outcome when one of the followers accept the plan, while the other rejects
it (see Table 1).
D = (A;R) or (R;A) If Follower 1 accepts the plan while Follower 2 rejects it, then the
outcome vector is
qk

z!R

v; c; k

+ (1  z)!R (v; c; k)

+ (1  qk)!C(v; k):
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The leaders best proposal in that case is the solution of
max
c

!R0 (v; c; k)
	
(31)
s.t.
qk

z!R1

v; c ; k

+ (1  z)!R1 (v; c; k)

+ (1  qk)!C1 (v; k)
 qk!L1 (v; k) + (1  qk)!C1 (v; k) (32)
and
qk

z!R2

v; c ; k

+ (1  z)!R2 (v; c; k)

+ (1  qk)!C2 (v; k)
 !R2 (v; c; k);
or equivalently
!R1 (v; c; k)  b1;
b1 =
8<:
!L1 (v;k) z!R1 (v;c ;k)
1 z if z < 1 and qk > 0
 1 otherwise,
(33)
and
!R2 (v; c; k)  b2;
b2 =
8<:
qkz!
R
2 (v;c ;k)+(1 qk)!C2 (v;k)
1 qk(1 z) if qk(1  z) < 1
qk!
R
2
 
v; c; k

+ (1  qk)!C2 (v; k) otherwise.
(34)
where the constraints are obtained by comparing what Follower 1 may expect if he
rejects the plan and what Follower 2 may expect if he accepts the plan. The leaders
best proposal corresponding to the decision pair (R;A) is obtained by changing the
identity of the followers.
D = (R;R) If both followers reject the plan, the outcome vector is
qk!
L(v; k) + (1  qk)!C(v; k)
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which does not depend on the coupon proposed by the leader, as long as it leads
the followers to reject the plan. It su¢ ces that the leader propose nothing to both
followers to achieve this outcome.
The optimization problems (27)-(28) and (31)-(32) involve the reorganization values !Ri :
Using the auxiliary variable y dened in (20) and di¤erentiating (24) with respect to y yields
 wk


1  y 1 

< 0 if y 2 [0; 1] ;
which shows that the reorganization value of the equityholder is decreasing in y on [0; 1],
with !Re (v; 0; k) = wk and !
R
e (v; 1; k) = 0: Similarly, it is straightforward to verify that the
total creditorsreorganization value !Rd (v; y; k) is concave in y and admits a maximum at
y =

1  
1   (1  ) (1  )
(1 )=
2 [0; 1] , (35)
with !Rd (v; 0; k) = 0 and !
R
d (v; 1; k) = wk (1  ) : These properties of the reorganization
values allow to characterize the leaders optimal plan analytically at any (v; k) :
Equityholders plan
D = (A;A) When the leader is the equityholder, the solution of problem (27)-(28) is ob-
tained by o¤ering the lower bound on their payo¤ to both followers, as dened by
(29). The optimal reorganization plan for the equityholder is therefore obtained by
solving for y the following:
!Rd (v; y; k) = bs + bj ; (36)
where !Rd (v; y; k) 2 [0; wk (1  )].
i If 0 < bs + bj < wk (1  ) , then there is a unique y 2 (0; 1) corresponding to a
unique total coupon satisfying (36), which is the solution to problem (27)-(28).
ii If wk (1  ) < bs + bj while !Rd (v; y; k) is positive, then there are two values
satisfying (36); Since the share of the equityholder is decreasing in y, the smallest
of these two values is the solution to problem (27)-(28).
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iii If wk (1  ) < bs + bj while !Rd (v; y; k) is negative, then the equityholder is not
able to o¤er their lower bounds to the creditors, and it is not possible for him to
propose a plan that will be accepted by both creditors.
iv If bs+ bj  0 while wk (1  ) > bs + bj , then the solution to problem (27)-(28) is
y = c = 0.
The relative share of the total coupon which is o¤ered to the senior and junior creditors
can then easily be determined by solving (9) for the senior debt coupon cs, given y.
D = (A;R) or (R;A) The solution of problem (31)-(32) is obtained by o¤ering the lower
bound b1 in (33) to Follower 1, and nothing to Follower 2. First, select the identity
of Follower 1 by choosing
arg min
i2fs;jg
n
!Li (v; k)  z!Ri

v; c; k
o
. (37)
The optimal reorganization plan for the equityholder is then obtained by solving for
y the following:
!Rd (v; y; k) = b1, (38)
using (13). If 0 < b1 < wk (1  ) , then there is a unique y 2 [0; 1] corresponding to
a unique coupon satisfying (38), which is the solution to problem (31)-(32); the other
possible cases are obtained similarly as for problem (27)-(28) above.
Creditors plan
If the leader is one of the creditors, he maximizes his share in the reorganized rm by
deciding both on the total coupon and on the relative share of the other creditor, which we
will label f . For a given total coupon, the leaders objective function is decreasing in the
share of the other creditor, so that it is optimal to o¤er Creditor f the lower bound on his
payo¤. Therefore, the objective functions (27) and (31) can both be written:
!Rd (v; y; k)  bf (39)
where !Rd (v; y; k) is a concave function in y admitting a maximum at y
 dened in (35).
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D = (A;A) In problem (27)-(28), the followerspayo¤s bf and be are dened by (29).
i If !Rd (v; y
; k) < bf , then it is not possible for the leader to o¤er a plan that will be
accepted by both followers.
Otherwise, if !Rd (v; y
; k)  bf , then we check if plan y satises the equityholders or
not.
ii If !Re (v; y
; k)  be, then the optimal plan corresponds to y. The relative share of the
two creditors in the reorganized coupon is obtained by solving !Rf (v; y
; k) = bf .
iii If !Re (v; y
; k) < be, the leader has to o¤er be to the equityholders, by proposing a plan
that solves
wk


  y + (1  ) y 11 

= be: (40)
Since the equity value is decreasing in y, then if wk  be, there is a unique solution
in [0; 1] to (40), denoted yb. If !Rd
 
v; yb; k
  bf , the optimal plan for the leader is yb
and the relative share of the two creditors in the reorganized coupon is obtained by
solving
!Rf

v; yb; k

= bf : (41)
iv If wk < be or !Rd
 
v; yb; k

< bf ; then it is not possible for the leader to o¤er a plan that
will be accepted by both followers.
D = (A;R) or (R;A) The solution of problem (31)-(32) depends on the identity of Fol-
lower 1, who accepts the plan. The leader chooses the identity of Follower 1 by
comparing his share in the two following cases.
i If Follower 1 is the equityholder, then the leader maximizes his share by o¤ering nothing
to the other creditor, cf = 0. If !Re (v; y
; k)  be, then the optimal plan corresponds
to y, whereas if !Re (v; y; k) < be and wk  be; then the optimal plan corresponds to
yb. If wk < be, it is not possible for the leader to o¤er a plan that will be accepted by
Follower 1.
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ii If Follower 1 is the other creditor, then if !Rd (v; y
; k) < bf , it is not possible for the leader
to o¤er a plan that will be accepted by Follower 1. Otherwise, the leader maximizes
his share by proposing plan y, and the relative share of the two creditors is obtained
by solving (41).
Appendix B: Numerical implementation
The value of what each claimant expects to recover from the Chapter 11 negotiation proce-
dure at a given date t = kd; k = 0; :::;K is a function of the value of the rms assets at that
date obtained by solving the stochastic dynamic program (??)-(??) by backward induction
from the last negotiation round, using (21), (16) and (17). Since the state space of the
dynamic program is continuous, the rst step is to partition it into a collection of convex
subsets, and obtain a corresponding nite set of grid points where the value functions are
to be evaluated. Piecewise-linear continuous interpolation functions are then dened to
approximate the value functions over the state space.
Let g0 < g1 < ::: < gm < ::: < gM dene a grid G on the space of asset values, and
let g0 = 0 and gM+1 = +1. Assume that approximations of the value functions, denoted
by ~!i, i 2 fs; j; eg; are known on G. We dene continuous piecewise linear interpolation
functions !^i on R such that at t = kd, !^i (v; k) = ~!i (v; k) on G and
!^i (v; k) =
8<: 0 for v < g0akim + hkimv for gm  v  gm+1, m = 0; :::;M
=
MX
m=0

akim + h
k
imv

1 (gm  v < gm+1) (42)
where 1 () is the indicator function.
The coe¢ cients akim and h
k
im of the piecewise linear interpolation functions are obtained
by setting !^i (v; k) = ~!i (v; k) on the grid and by extrapolating outside the grid. They are
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given by
aki0 = 0
hki0 =
~!i (g1; k)
g1
akim =
gm+1~!i (gm; k)  gm~!i (gm+1; k)
gm+1   gm ;m = 1; :::;M   1
hkim =
~!i (gm+1; k)  ~!i (gm; k)
gm+1   gm ;m = 1; :::;M   1
akiM = a
k
iM 1
hkiM = h
k
iM 1: (43)
Using the interpolated value functions in (42) at v = gn; n = 1; : : :M; yields for k =
0; :::;K   1 and t = kd
e rdEvt [!^i (Vt+d; k + 1)]
= e rdEvt
"
MX
m=0

ak+1im + h
k+1
im Vt+d

Im
#
=
MX
m=0
Anm~!i (gm; k + 1) (44)
where Im denotes the indicator function of the event fgm  Vt+d < gm+1g. Using (43), the
transition parameters Anm; from state v = gn at t to the interval [gm; gm+1) at t+ d; which
are constant under our assumption of equal length negotiation rounds, are then given by
Anm =
8>>>><>>>>:
e rdEvt
h
g1 Vt+d
g1 g0 I0
i
for m = 0
e rdEvt
h
Vt+d gm 1
gm gm 1 Im 1 +
gm+1 Vt+d
gm+1 gm Im
i
for 1  m < M
e rdEvt
h
Vt+d gm 1
gm gm 1 (Im 1 + Im)
i
for m =M:
(45)
Recall that, according to our assumption (1) about the assets value process, at v = gn
Evt (Im) =  (xn;m+1)   (xnm)
Evt (Vt+dIm) = gn



xn;m+1   
p
d

  

xnm   
p
d

(46)
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where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and
xnm =
ln

gm
gn

 

r   22

d

p
d
: (47)
The algorithm to compute the value vector of the K stage, three player game is then
the following.
Algorithm
1. Initialization
(a) Read parameter values. Dene G, the grid on the assets space.
(b) For n = 1; : : : ;M and m = 0; : : : ;M , compute the transition parameters Anm
according to (45)-(46)
2. Negotiation rounds
(a) Set !Ci (v) = 0, i 2 fs; j; eg and k = K: Set the identity of the leader at round K
(b) For v = g1, . . . , gM
i. If v  Ck, then the rm is liquidated and !i (v; k) = 0, i 2 f0; 1; 2g
ii. Otherwise compute the equilibrium outcome of negotiation round k
A. Compute the liquidation value vector !L(v; k) according to (4)-(6)
B. Compute the judge coupon c according to (26) and the emergence value
vector under the judges plan, !R(v; c; k), according to (9), (??) and
(14)
C. Solve problem (27) as in (7) or (7) according to the identity of the leader
D. Solve problem (31) as in Appendix (7) or (7) according to the identity
of the leader
E. Compare the leaders payo¤ for the four possible decision pairs of the fol-
lower. Record the equilibrium strategies i (v; k) and outcomes ~!i (v; k) =
!i (v; k), i 2 f0; 1; 2g according to (21)
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3. Continuation values
(a) for v = gn, n = 0,: : :, M and i 2 fs; j; eg, set
~!Ci (v; 0) =
MX
m=0
Anm~!i (gm; k + 1)
(b) Set k = k   1
(c) If k = 0, stop. the equilibrium value function is given by ~!Ci (v; 0)
(d) Otherwise, identify the leader at round k and go to step 2b.
Appendix C: Equilibrium probabilities
In our simulations, the number of domains varies from 2 to 4, depending on parameter
values. To keep the exposition concise, we will detail the calculations for parameterizations
that yield three di¤erent domains: One domain is liquidation for asset value v 2 (0; Ck),
another one is reorganization under the leaders plan for asset value v 2 (Ck; ak), and a
last one is negotiation continuation for asset value v 2 (ak;+1). The critical level ak is
numerically determined by the dynamic programming algorithm.
We dene the following thresholds at which standard normal cumulative distribution
functions are evaluated
xk =
ln V0ak +

  22

kd

p
kd
;
yk =
ln V0Ck +

  22

kd

p
kd
:
We denote n
 fhg ;ij	 the multivariate standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion evaluated at thresholds fhg with correlation coe¢ cients ij	.
Liquidation probabilities Liquidation occurs at the rst round i¤ Vd  C1. It
occurs at the second round i¤ Vd > a1, the judge does not cramdown and V2d  C2. It
occurs at the third round i¤ Vd > a1, V2d > a2, the judge does not cramdown during the
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rst two rounds, and V3d  C3 or V3d > a3 and the judge does not cramdown. Liquidation
probabilities for the three rounds are therefore given by
L1 = 1 ( y1) ;
L2 = (1  q1) 2 (x1;   y2; 12) ;
L3 = (1  q1) (1  q2) 3 (x1; x2; y3; 12; 13; 23)
+ (1  q1) (1  q2) (1  q3) 3 (x1; x2; x3; 12; 13; 23) :
where the correlation coe¢ cients between the Brownian motion at rounds one and two, one
and three, and two and three, are given by
12 =
r
d
2d
=
1p
2
; 13 =
r
d
3d
=
1p
3
; 23 =
r
2d
3d
=
p
2p
3
:
Cramdown probabilities The judge imposes a reorganization plan at the rst round
when Vd > a1 with probability q1. She imposes a plan at the second round when Vd > a1,
she does not cramdown at the rst round, and when V2d > a2 with probability q2. She
imposes a plan at the third round when Vd > a1, V2d > a2, she does not cramdown during
the rst two rounds, and when V3d > a3 with probability q3. Cramdown probabilities for
the three rounds are therefore given by
C1 = q11 (x1) ;
C2 = (1  q1) q22 (x1;x2; 12) ;
C3 = (1  q1) (1  q2) q33 (x1; x2; x3; 12; 13; 23) :
Reorganization (under the Leaders plan) probabilities The rm is reorganized
under the shareholdersplan at the rst round i¤ Vd > C1 and Vd  a1. It is reorganized
under the junior creditorsplan at the second round i¤Vd > a1, the judge does not cramdown
and V2d > C2 and V2d  a2. It is reorganized under the senior creditorsplan at the third
round i¤ Vd > a1, V2d > a2, the judge does not cramdown during the rst two rounds, and
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V3d > C3 and V3d  a3. Reorganization (under the Leaders plan) probabilities for the three
rounds are therefore given by
R1 = 1 ( x1)  1 ( y1) ;
R2 = (1  q1) [1 (x1)  2 (x1;x2; 12)  2 (x1;   y2; 12)] ;
R3 = (1  q1) (1  q2) [2 (x1;x2; 12)  3 (x1; x2; x3; 12; 13; 23)
 3 (x1; x2; y3; 12; 13; 23)] :
One can verify that the probability that renegotiation carries on to the second round, which
is (1  q1) 1 (x1), is actually equal to
1 L1  C1  R1:
Similarly, the probability that renegotiation carries on to the third round, which is
(1  q1) (1  q2) 2 (x1;x2; 12) ;
is actually equal to
(1  q1) 1 (x1) L2  C2  R2:
Finally, the probability that renegotiation carries on to the third round must also be equal
to
L3 +C3 +R3:
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Figure 1b: Senior creditorsplans
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Figure 1c: Junior creditorsplans
Figure 1: Allocation of rm value proposed by claimholders as a function of asset value.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the fractions (in percentage) of rm value o¤ered to the three classes
of claimholders, as a function of asset value. The thin line represents the share of equityholders, the
dashed line represents that of senior creditors, and the thick line represents that of junior creditors.
In gure 1a, the fractions are set according to the plan proposed by shareholders in the rst round.
In gure 1b, they are set according to the plan proposed by senior creditors in the second round.
In gure 1c, they are set according to the plan proposed by junior creditors in the third round. For
each proposed plan, the arrows on top of the gures indicate the equilibrium domain: L means the
rm is liquidated, R means the plan is rejected, and A means the plan is accepted. Parameters are
set as in Table 3.
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Tables
Follower 2
A R
A !R (v; c)
qk

z!R
 
v; c

+ (1  z)!R (v; c)
+(1  qk) !C (v; k)
Follower
1
R
qk

z!R
 
v; c

+ (1  z)!R (v; c)
+(1  qk) !C (v; k)
qkL!
L
 
v; c0

+ (1  qk) !C (v; k)
Table 1: Normal form representation of the game at a given round k.
This table shows the outcomes of a negotiation game at any given round k, when the Leader
proposes a reorganization plan to Follower 1 and Follower 2. The followers decide separately whether
to accept (A) or reject (R) the plan, which consists in proposing a new reorganized coupons c to
the creditors. If both followers accept the Leaders plan, then the rm is reorganized and the
reorganized coupons are distributed. If both followers reject the plan, then the rm is liquidated
by the bankruptcy judge with a probability qk, and the game moves to the next bargaining round
otherwise. Finally, if the followers take opposite decisions on the Leaders plan, then the rm is
reorganized by the judge with a probability qk. In this case, she imposes her own reorganization
plan with a probability z, and implements the Leaders plan with a probability (1  z).
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Number Percentage
of lings of lings
Panel A: Distribution of ling dates
1997 4 3:05
1998 2 1:53
1999 12 9:16
2000 16 12:21
2001 35 26:72
2002 33 25:19
2003 14 10:69
2004 4 3:05
2005 9 6:87
2006 2 1:53
2007 0 0
Panel B: Distribution of rms industries
Transportation
and public utilities 46 35:11
Mining 2 1:53
Construction 2 1:53
Manufacturing 36 27:48
Wholesale trade 5 3:82
Retail trade 15 11:45
Services 20 15:27
Others 5 3:82
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the sample of Chapter 11 lings.
The data is provided by Compustat and www.bankruptcydata.com, and consists in a sample of
131 Chapter 11 lings by 128 rms between 1997 and 2007. Panel A shows the distribution of lings
by year of ling. Panel B provides information on the industry distribution of the lings according
to their SIC code.
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Description Notation Base value
Risk-free interest rate r 4%
Firm-specic parameters
Assets return during Chapter 11 (%)  1:5%
Asset return volatility (%)  35%
Asset value at the entry in Chapter 11 V 100
Coupon level c 10
Share of senior coupon  80%
Net tax advantage of debt after emergence  30%
Payout rate after emergence  2%
Bankruptcy-specic parameters
Length of a negotiation round d 2
Number of negotiation rounds K 3
Judges impatience q
 
3
4 ;
3
4 ;
3
4

Probability that the judge imposes her own plan z 0:5
Claimant i = fs; j; eg bargaining power i 13
Liquidation costs  2%
Financial distress costs  20%
Table 3: Parameters resulting from model calibration.
This table reports base case values for the model parameters. Firm-specic parameters (except
for the net tax advantage of debt) are estimated from a sample of 131 Chapter 11 lings over the
period 19972007. They are computed using quarterly data over a period of two years prior to the
ling date (annual data is used for the share of senior coupon). Bankruptcy-specic parameters are
chosen to be consistent with reported Chapter 11 durations. Liquidation and nancial distress costs
are obtained from Bris et al. (2006).
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Liquidation Reorganization probability (%)
probability under under
(%) Leader plan Judge plan
Base case Total 14:36 52:42 33:22
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:57] [42:04; 10:26; 0:12] [31:89; 1:20; 0:12]
 = 1% Total 14:74 52:23 33:03
Per round [5:01; 9:17; 0:56] [42:10; 10:02; 0:11] [31:73; 1:18; 0:11]
 = 3% Total 13:26 52:98 33:77
Per round [4:23; 8:46; 0:57] [41:86; 10:98; 0:14] [32:35; 1:28; 0:14]
 = 25% Total 2:18 81:01 16:81
Per round [0:62; 1:47; 0:09] [71:80; 9:17; 0:03] [16:54; 0:24; 0:03]
 = 45% Total 24:19 40:75 35:07
Per round [12:13; 11:20; 0:86] [32:95; 7:59; 0:21] [32:95; 1:91; 0:21]
c = 8 Total 14:39 52:19 33:42
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:60] [42:04; 9:99; 0:16] [31:89; 1:37; 0:16]
c = 12 Total 14:35 52:50 33:15
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:55] [42:04; 10:35; 0:11] [31:89; 1:15; 0:11]
 = 70% Total 14:38 52:27 33:35
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:59] [42:04; 10:08; 0:14] [31:89; 1:31; 0:14]
 = 90% Total 14:35 52:53 33:12
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:55] [42:04; 10:39; 0:10] [31:89; 1:13; 0:10]
Table 4: Equilibrium probabilities for di¤erent model calibrations with respect to
rm-specic parameters.
This table reports liquidation and reorganization (under Leader or judge plan) probabilities over
the whole Chapter 11 procedure as well as for each round. Probabilities are given for the base case
and for deviations from the base case as one rm-specic parameter value is changed at a time.
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Liquidation Reorganization probability (%)
probability under under
(%) Leader plan Judge plan
Base case Total 14:36 52:42 33:22
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:57] [42:04; 10:26; 0:12] [31:89; 1:20; 0:12]
d = 1 Total 1:47 58:62 39:90
Per round [0:00; 1:05; 0:42] [38:09; 20:00; 0:53] [37:14; 2:23; 0:53]
d = 3 Total 40:00 31:55 28:45
Per round [27:79; 11:62; 0:59] [27:08; 4:35; 0:12] [27:08; 1:25; 0:12]
z = 0:35 Total 17:25 55:23 27:52
Per round [4:80; 11:14; 1:31] [46:41; 8:28; 0:54] [24:99; 2:24; 0:29]
z = 0:65 Total 7:46 70:50 22:04
Per round [4:80; 2:44; 0:22] [63:00; 7:45; 0:04] [21:28; 0:67; 0:09]
 = 1% Total 14:74 51:32 33:94
Per round [4:80; 9:37; 0:58] [40:88; 10:32; 0:12] [32:59; 1:23; 0:12]
 = 3% Total 14:36 52:42 33:22
Per round [4:80; 8:99; 0:57] [42:04; 10:26; 0:12] [31:89; 1:20; 0:12]
 = 10% Total 4:45 54:55 41:00
Per round [0:11; 3:49; 0:85] [38:01; 15:89; 0:65] [37:13; 3:22; 0:65]
 = 30% Total 29:61 46:03 24:36
Per round [19:90; 9:35; 0:36] [40:84; 5:12; 0:07] [23:55; 0:74; 0:07]
Table 5: Equilibrium probabilities for di¤erent model calibrations with respect to
bankruptcy-specic parameters.
This table reports liquidation and reorganization (under Leader or judge plan) probabilities over
the whole Chapter 11 procedure as well as for each round. Probabilities are given for the base case
and for deviations from the base case as one bankruptcy-specic parameter value is changed at a
time.
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Sample Sample Average
Authors size period value
Panel A: Liquidation rate
Denis and Rodgers (2007) 224 19851994 18%
Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian (2007) 459 19911998 20%
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 312 19952001 24%
Carapeto (2005) 389 19861997 14%
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2004) 1,770 19792002 21%
Panel B: Time spent in Chapter 11 (in days)
Denis and Rodgers (2007) 224 19851994 710
Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian (2007) 262 19911998 447
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 312 19952001 822
Elayan and Meyer (2001) 146 19801995 708
Helwege (1999) 57 19801991 928
Panel C: Frequency of Absolute Priority Rule violations
Bharath, Panchapagesan and Werner (2010) 531 19912005 22%
Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) 312 19952001 12%
Table 6: Statistics about Chapter 11 lings
reported by most recent empirical studies.
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